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Fishing. Western, Japanese and Islander Perceptions of Ecology 
and Modernization in the Pacific 
Kate Barclay 
Summary 
This paper explores conflicting representations of Japanese fishing 
practices in a joint venture company in the Pacific. W€stern and 
Islander representations frequently included suspicions that 
Japanese management was cheating their local partner and 
engaging in illegal and ecologically destructive fishing practices. In 
contrast, Japanese self-identified as as socially and ecologically 
responsible in contrast to the callous disregard for employment 
security and destructive industrial fishing methods used by 
Americans. Analysis of these different perspectives shows 
underlying conflict about whose development assistance is best, 
with Islander perspectives demonstrating postcolonial reactions to 
their continued subordination in the world system. [1] 
Introduction 
Research on a joint venture tuna fishing and processing enterprise 
based in the Solomon Islands from 1971 to 2000, Solomon Taiyo 
Ltd., provides a means to investigate clashing conceptions of 
identity and modernity. The analysis is based on interviews, news 
media and government documents. Japanese self-representations 
are juxtaposed against representations by Westerners and 
Islanders. Both Western and Islander representation of the 
Japanese-owned firm Solomon Taiyo frequently included suspicions 
that management was cheating its local partner, the Solomon 
Islands government and that the company was engaged in illegal 
and ecologically destructive Japanese I Asian fishing practices. 
Representations of Solomon Taiyo to some extent varied according 
to whether the commentator was of Western descent or Solomon 
Islander, reflecting different relations with Japan, but in general 
depicted the Japanese as bringing a 'bad' kind of modernity to the 
Islands. By contrast, Japanese r€presentations of business and 
fishing practices contrasted their own socially and ecologically 
responsible behavior with Westerners' callous disregard for 
employment security and destructive industrial fishing methods. 
Japanese involvement in Solomon Taiyo was self-identified as a 
charitable mission for the economic and social development of the 
Solomon Islands. Japanese managers saw themselves as bringing a 
'good' modernity to Solomon Islands. 
Japanese and Western modernities are similar in that they are 
both capitalist, although there are also some culturally and 
historically contingent specificities, such as shorter /longer time 
frames and different attitudes towards relationships of obligation. 
This paper does not address the concrete nature of Japanese and 
Western modernities, or which might be best for Solomon Islands 
(probably neither, Solomon Islanders' own modernity would likely 
be best). Neither does it assess how beneficial the company was 
for Solomon Islands in terms of material economic development, I 
have discussed that elsewhere (Barclay 2000; 2005; forthcoming). 
The central concern here is the subjective aspects of the social 
interactions of the company; specifically to reveal the politics 
informing narratives that view development projects as good or 
bad because of the ethnicity of the people involved. Narratives 
that portray Japanese fisheries as good or bad are influenced by 
the subjective positions of the narrators, a point that is useful to 
bear in mind when considering contemporary public debates about 
over-fishing and whaling. 
The concepts of identity and modernity frame this discussion. 
Scholars such as Michael Billig have convincingly argued that nation 
is the most important communal identity in today's world (Billig 
1995) [2]. National identity is in turn greatly influenced by ideas 
about modernity. Marshall Berman has shown that the aesthetic 
and literary movements most usually associated with modernism 
may be grouped with more materialist movements such as Marxism 
and modernization theory as an overall worldview ordered by a 
teleological striving for modernity (Berman 1982). Marianne 
Torgovnick's work on the appreciation of primitive art 
demonstrates that modernity requires as its flipside the creation of 
a primitive against which it can be defined (1990), in much the 
same way as Europe required the Orient in Edward Said's seminal 
work Orientalism (1978). For their part critical development 
theorists have asserted that developmentalist discourses, visible in 
preoccupations with 'progress' and 'development'-or their 
lack-in representations of peoples, have acted to denigrate 
peoples identified as underdeveloped (Manzo 1991; Sachs 1997; 
Escobar 1997; Hanlon 1998). Taken together these apparently 
disparate pieces of social theory build the argument that ideas 
about modernity have long been influencing communal identities, 
especially nations [3]. The conflicting perspectives on Japanese 
identity in relation to modernization and capitalist development in 
fisheries discussed in this paper serve to underline the contested 
nature of modernity, and of histories of modernization. 
The identities discussed in this paper are sometimes about race, 
sometimes nation, and occasionally about class. Rather than 
pinning it down to only 'race' or 'nation' or 'ethnicity', I prefer to 
discuss using the umbrella term 'identity'. The terms 'Japanese', 
'Asians' 'Solomon Islanders' and 'the West' used in this paper are 
inherently problematic, but are the most expedient to enable 
coherent discussion. 'European-descent English speaking people' 
were usually referred to by Solomon Islanders as 'European' 
(although it included mostly Australians and New Zealanders), or 
local terms such as arai kwaio or tie vaka. In this paper 
'Westerner' will be used, except where the people under 
discussion are more specifically identified with a particular place 
(such as the US). 'Japanese' in the context of Solomon Taiyo sits 
uncomfortably over a split between mainland Japanese managers 
and Okinawan fishermen, and uneasily under the umbrella term 
'Asian'. For the purposes of this paper, however, it is possible to 
speak of 'the Japanese' to the extent that they were spoken of as 
such by the participants in the research. 
It is also the case that, in a world of cultural flows and diffusions, 
ideas are not discreet units belonging exclusively to any one group, 
so it is problematic to attribute ethnic provenance to 
representations, such as calling them Western or Japanese, as I do 
here. Japanese categorizations of peoples have been influenced by 
Western categorizations of peoples, especially in terms of 'nation' 
and modernist understandings of 'civilization' (Dikotter 1997). 
Likewise Solomon Islander categorizations of peoples have long 
been influenced by English language representations, both in the 
colonial period and after, when Australians and New Zealanders 
have occupied prominent positions in Solomon Islands society and 
where English is one of the important languages. Global English 
language representations of peoples are thus part of the 
worldviews of all the players in this research. It is not the case, 
however, that representations from all groups were the same; 
there were discernable differences between types of 
representations, and it is on this basis that (slippery) attributions 
of certain representations as belonging to particular ethnic groups 
are used in this paper. 
----------- ----- -----
Mop 1. Tire Wesreml'ru:ifu Ocean 
Solomon Taiyo Ltd 
Solomon Islands is a double chain of islands stretching into the 
western Pacific south east of Papua New Guinea and north east of 
Australia, with a current population of around 400,000. These 
islands were annexed by Britain in the late nineteenth century. 
Solomon Islands first became significant to Japan in World War II 
when it was a key battlefield in the Pacific War. Of the nearly 
400,000 Japanese (and conscripted Taiwanese and Koreans) who 
went to Melanesia during World War II, over sixty per cent died 
there, mostly from starvation and sickness (Nelson 1982). Over 
20,000 Japanese troops died on Guadalcanal. 
Japanese occupation of Solomon Islands was not like the long-term 
colonial situation in other former German territories in the Pacific. 
Japanese forces only reached Solomon Islands in 1943, at the 
furthest stretch of Empire, managing to maintain military 
occupation in some parts of the islands before being turned back 
by US forces in 1944. Oral histories of the war years indicate that 
Solomon Islanders vacated the parts occupied by the Japanese, so 
there was very limited contact (White and Laracy 1988). Some 
Solomon Islander men were employed by US forces, but none 
seemed to have worked in this way for the Japanese. Most Solomon 
Islanders thus avoided being caught up in the fighting, although 
the war years must have been difficult for those displaced from 
areas where fighting was occurring. 
Although the Japanese ousted the British colonizers, Solomon 
Islanders did not identify the Japanese as liberators, instead most 
saw US forces as their saviors and identified the Japanese as the 
enemy during the war and for some decades after. Hungry 
Japanese soldiers stole food from villagers. Apparently Japanese 
soldiers defecated on the desks of colonial District Officers, which 
may or may not have been seen as a bad thing by Solomon 
Islanders, but they also defecated on sacred places, which was 
certainly taken as an insult (Fifi'i 1989, 45-47). Although many saw 
the Japanese as the enemy, a collection of Pacific Islander oral 
histories of World War II showed that there were those who 
'approached both sides with wariness, pragmatism, and humanity' 
(White and Laracy 1988, 3). Some Solomon Islanders felt the 
Japanese were less racist towards them than were the British 
colonizers (BSIP 1972a, 80). But on the whole it is fair to say that 
the war background was a negative starting point for interactions 
with the Japanese in Solomon Taiyo. According to former 
fisherman Hirara, when his fishing boat first ventured into Solomon 
Islands fishing grounds in the early 1970s, many villagers ran 
screaming into their houses, or threw rocks, because they 
associated Japanese ships with war [4]. 
By 1970 the British colonial administration was preparing Solomon 
Islands for Independence (1978). The administration deemed that 
there was not enough of a capitalist economic basis for 
independent statehood so decolonisation preparations included 
inviting foreign investors to establish locally based enterprises, to 
join the few forestry and plantation businesses (mostly owned by 
Westerners) and trading businesses (mostly owned by ethnic 
Chinese) [5]. 
At the same time it became clear that newly independent 
countries would be declaring two hundred nautical mile exclusive 
economic zones around their coastlines under the United Nations 
Law of the Sea, so Japanese fishing companies wanted to invest in 
local bases to secure their access to resources (Waugh 1994). Out 
of this confluence of interests Solomon Taiyo Ltd was established 
in 1973 as a joint venture between the Solomon Islands 
government and the fishing giant Taiyo Gyogyo (which changed its 
name to Maruha in 1993). 
Solomon Taiyo vessel and bait boat 
The most important market was the British tinned skipjack (a 
tuna-like species also called bonito) markeL Solomon Taiyo was 
one of the few companies in the world that produced tinned 
skipjack according to the requirements of large British 
supermarket chains such as Sainsbury's and Waitrose, which 
preferred high quality, socially and ecologically responsible 
products. Solomon Taiyo grew steadily over the years until by 1999 
it had an annual turnover of around USD$100 million, employed 
close to 3,000 Solomon Islanders on its fleet of more than twenty 
fishing boats, and had a large shore base with a canning factory. At 
start up most employees had been Japanese nationals but over the 
years the proportion of Solomon Islander employees increased. In 
1999 there were less than ten mainland Japanese managers, and 
around thirty Okinawan fishermen working for the company. Up to 
thirty technical positions were filled by short-term contractors 
from the Philippines and Fiji, but the rest of the workforce, 
including some senior management, most middle management and 
technical supervisory positions, were filled by Solomon Islanders. 
Since the mid 1980s the company had been 51 percent owned by 
the Solomon Islands government, with the Japanese partner 
company owning the remaining 49 percent of shares, and 
appointments to the Board of Directors were balanced between 
the two shareholders. 
Skipjack at Honiara Market 
Solomon Taiyo's main form of fishing was pole-and-line (called 
'poling' in Australia and ipponzuri in Japanese) for skipjack. This is 
a low technology, high labor form of fishing with very low bycatch 
levels, and that can produce high quality meat. The skipjack 
fishery was in the open sea outside the reefs and lagoons. Solomon 
Taiyo's pole-and-line fishery had an associated bait fishery to 
catch small shiny silver and Western fish that were 'chummed' 
(scattered) live across the surface above schooling skipjack to 
induce a feeding frenzy and encourage skipjack to snap at the 
shiny hooks on the lines. The baitfish were caught by bouke-ami 
nets at night in lagoons using lights to attract the fish. They were 
stored live in wells in the hold of fishing ships to be used the 
following day. 
----------- -------
Pole and line vessel 
Solomon Taiyo's mainland Japanese employees were mainly career 
managers seconded for periods of three to four years from Maruha. 
As a Large company with a Long history, Maruha has had the pick of 
the crop of young graduates from Japan's fisheries-related 
universities. The importance of where young men went to school 
or university, generating a Lifelong network of contacts [6], have 
been as important in gaining Lifetime employment in Maruha as 
they have in any Large prestigious Japanese company. In addition 
to the university graduates, some of Maruha's managers were (high 
school graduate) fishermen who worked their way up the ranks to 
management positions. At Least two managers involved with 
Solomon Taiyo over the Life of the company were 
fishermen-managers. Maruha's managers were organized into two 
streams, those who would spend their careers managing overseas 
operations around the world (fishermen-managers were in this 
group), and those who would rotate as managers overseas for five 
or ten years then return to Tokyo to act as central managers 
(Meltzhoff and LiPuma 1985). Solomon Taiyo's managers had 
usually been of the first kind, but in the Later years of the joint 
venture at Least one manager with experience at Solomon Taiyo 
was promoted to a central management role in Tokyo [7]. 
Solomon Taiyo's General Manager in 1999 had worked in Nigeria 
and Mozambique before being posted to Solomon Islands, with 
stints in the Tokyo office between each posting. The Operations 
Manager, the Fleet Manager and the Cannery Manager in 1999 were 
permanent Maruha employees, but were more or Less permanently 
based at Solomon Taiyo. Two of these were married to Pacific 
Islander women. The Operations Manager had been working for 
Solomon Taiyo since the early 1970s and the Fleet Manager since 
the mid 1980s. The Cannery Manager had only been at Solomon 
Taiyo a couple of years, but before that had Lived and worked in 
Fiji for many years. Other managers usually Left their families in 
Japan while they worked overseas, for a variety of reasons 
including concerns about families being able to fit into the host 
society and about families being able to fit back into Japan when 
they returned, especially for children reaching middle school age, 
when school performance became vital for their future prospects. 
Solomon Taiyo's human resource management had always been 
affected by the intra Solomon Islands ethnic rivalries that had 
been exacerbated during the colonial era and left unresolved by 
successive independent governments. 'Ethnic tension' was the 
form in which a variety of dissatisfactions within contemporary 
Solomon Islands society (mostly about persistent failures and 
unevenness in economic development) came to be expressed. In 
late 1998 these dissatisfactions boiled over into widespread 
violence, particularly between the men of Guadalcanal and 
Malaita, and culminated in a coup in mid 2000. The government 
remained unstable until 2003 when the Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands restored state control. The unstable business 
environment, however, coincided with a new purchasing strategy 
by main buyers in the UK, so the Japanese partner company 
withdrew from Solomon Taiyo in 2000. The then wholly Solomon 
Islands government owned company was renamed Soltai and 
reopened in 2001 [8]. 
Western and Islander representations of Japanese fisheries 
Westerners who have worked closely with Japanese fisheries, such 
as government officials who work with Japanese government and 
company representatives on international fisheries issues, 
generally identify Japanese fisheries negotiators as 'very tough' 
but reliable in honoring agreements [9]. Such representations by 
well-informed commentators do not talk of a monolithic 'Asian' 
approach to fisheries, but distinguish Japan from countries such as 
Korea and Taiwan (and more recently China), seen as more prone 
to illegal fishing, breaking environmental laws and regulations, and 
mis-reporting catches (Schurman 1998). 
Travel brochure image of Solomon Islands fishing 
General Western public opinion, however, has tended to 
categorize Japanese and Asian fisheries together as 'bad'. Former 
Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating accused both Japan and 
South Korea of illegal fishing, misreporting catches and under 
paying for catches (The Australian 1994), and Australian Senator 
Bob Brown has said of Japanese fisheries: 'When it comes to 
marauding our oceans it seems the Japanese have no limits' 
(Sforza 2006). English language representations of Japanese 
fisheries have often been negative, and often contrasted Japanese 
fisheries unfavourably with Western organizations. 
[L]ocal fishing resources are flowing out of the 
countries concerned through the operations of the 
Japanese joint ventures. Also, the operation of the 
Japanese fishing companies never lead to the 
development of the local fishing industry and the 
development of local fishing technology ... Do the 
Japanese firms feel responsible for the well-being of 
local employees and local economies? The obvious 
consequence will be that these Japanese firms will 
completely dominate the local markets and will control 
the prices of fish inside the countries ... The Japanese 
government in January, 1979 gave Tonga and Western 
Samoa $750,000 worth of canned tuna in 'grant aid.' 
This 'gift' was made merely at the convenience of the 
Japanese fishing business and the Japanese 
government. The tuna skipjack industry, suffering from 
a slump, wanted the Japanese government to buy 
surplus canned tuna at the taxpayers' cost, while the 
Japanese government suffering from surplus foreign 
exchange holdings wanted to abate its dollar reserve. 
This 'gift' also had the effect of imposing 'canned food 
culture' on the people of Western Samoa and Tonga. In 
sharp contrast with this selfish type of 'aid', we 
witnessed a really helpful kind of assistance provided by 
Denmark to Western Samoa ... The Japanese fishing 
industry, unless it discards its arrogance and 
complacency, someday will certainly be carried out of 
the seas of the world (UNDP c.1983). 
Solomon Taiyo was usually portrayed in English-language media as 
representative of these 'bad' Japanese I Asian companies. The 
kinds of practices of which Solomon Taiyo was often suspected 
included cheating the Solomon Islands government out of profits, 
treating Solomon Islander employees unfairly, colluding corruptly 
with government in development projects that bring no benefits to 
the general populace (Hviding 1996, 233), and fishing practices 
that were ecologically unsustainable, illegal and/or conducted 
without consultation with relevant village communities [1 0]. 
'Here we go again. After the Asian plunder of Solomon 
Islands forests, its fishery is now under heavy attack ... 
First they did it with forestry. Are they now doing it 
with fish? ... Under pressure from aid donors disgusted by 
uncontrolled Asian plunder of the forests .. .' (Islands 
Business 1996, 43). 
This article was about events occurring in the early 1990s during 
the administration of the late former Prime Minister Mamaloni. 
First a joint venture called Makirabelle was started between 
Makira Province (Mamaloni's home province) and a Philippines 
based company, Frabelle. Makirabelle asked for 35,000 metric tons 
from the national total allowable catch (TAC), so the TAC was 
increased by Cabinet from 75,000 to 120,000 metric tons. This TAC 
increase was not a problem because South Pacific Community 
tagging research indicated that an increase in Solomon Islands TAC 
to this level would probably be sustainable, and in any case 
despite the increased TAC the actual catch still did not exceed 
70,000 metric tons. But Makirabelle had set a precedent and by 
1995 there were numerous 'joint ventures', with Ministers and 
their wives on the Boards, and the TAC jumped to 500,000 metric 
tons, most of which was fortunately never caught. 
The article cited two companies as 'the good' and four as 'the 
bad' of the Solomon Islands fishing industry during this period. 
'The good' were Solomon Taiyo itself and another company 
National Fisheries Development (NFD), which for the first decade 
or so had substantial Japanese input via Solomon Taiyo. In 1999 
NFD was owned by Singapore-based multinationally-owned 
company Trimarine. Solomon Taiyo and NFD were defined as good 
because they complied with local conditions for catch reporting, 
local employment and licensing fees. 'The bad' were joint 
ventures with two companies based in the Philippines, one in 
Thailand and one in Singapore, who apparently did not comply. 
Both 'the good' and 'the bad' companies, therefore, had Asian 
input, so the opening premise of the article that 'Asian' fisheries 
were resource plunderers does not fit the observable evidence. 
Such counterfactual representations may indicate that identity 
politics is involved, in this case an anti-Asian discourse about 
resource capitalism. In building an image of 'Asian' fishing as bad 
the article erased the Asian ness of 'the good'. 
The negative tropes of Japanese I Asian fisheries as socially and 
ecologically unconcerned resource plunderers constitute a kind of 
Oriental ism. The flipside of the negative tropes of Asian fisheries 
in this Oriental ism is the construction of Westerners as 'green' and 
development-minded influences in the Third World. In this sense 
the identity 'aid donor' is interesting in the Islands Business 
article. Japan has been a major aid donor in the Pacific for some 
decades but the ideal aid donor the journalist had in mind was 
clearly not Asian, but probably Western. The Islands Business 
article represented bad Asian fishing companies being brought to 
task by good Western aid donors. 
[A]sthis abundant fishery is 'discovered' by more and 
more Asian ships moving ever southward, locals are 
noticing the impact of large fishing ships on their 
catches. A fisher of Lengana village explains: 'The 
Japanese fleet gets permission from the [Solomon 
Islands] Fisheries Department. The boats come right 
close to the reefs where our people usually do their 
fishing. They don't ask permission in the village; they 
just go there. And villagers are asking: 'Why are these 
people fishing in our sea?' They do not know that the 
sea is open and that Fisheries can just let anyone fish 
anywhere.' He also objects to the way the outsiders 
fish: 'The Japanese take thousands of fish of all kinds. 
They do not worry that in their nets are sharks and 
dolphins. There is nothing left for village people to 
catch. And the Japanese fleets do not want to share 
anything with the villager people. Normally if you fish 
on that reef, you must share your catch with the 
villagers. The village elders spoke strongly to them and 
pointed out their mistakes. So the Japanese people just 
give a bit of fish, not much. Locals are still angry, 
though' (Kalgovas 2000). 
This kind of representation of Solomon Taiyo's activities was 
common in my interviews (the article was describing activities 
conducted by Solomon Taiyo alone). Like the Islands Business 
article, evidence to the contrary was overlooked in this narrative. 
Because Solomon Taiyo's most important market was ecologically 
concerned British supermarket chains including Sainsbury's, 
Solomon Taiyo had a commercial imperative to be 'green' and was 
actually not far from environmental best practice for an industrial 
fishing company. In 1999 the company was working towards 
achieving accreditation by the Marine Stewardship Council [11]. 
Skipjack are a resilient species and the pole-and-line method 
employed by Solomon Taiyo was not as ecologically destructive as 
other methods of industrial fishing. 
Solomon Taiyo's baitfishery, conducted on reefs and in lagoons, 
could potentially have depleted food fish stocks as asserted in the 
Kalgovas article. The perception that the baitfishery depleted food 
stocks in lagoons has existed since the earliest days of Solomon 
Taiyo (BSIP 1972b, 3; Bennett 1987, 336). Most Solomon Islanders I 
interviewed believed Solomon Taiyo's baitfishing was depleting 
fish stocks in lagoons, and often expressed this by saying that small 
fish attract big fish, so by taking out too many small fish for bait 
Solomon Taiyo reduced the numbers of larger food fish available in 
the lagoons, and that that local fishers now had to go further off 
shore and fish for longer periods to get the same catch compared 
to the years before Solomon Taiyo started fishing [12]. But 
according to the Solomon Islands Fisheries Division and bodies such 
as the Australian Council for International Agricultural Research, 
that had researched the effects of Solomon Taiyo's baitfishery on 
food fish stocks, the baitfishery was sustainable (Blaber and 
Copland 1990; Blaber, Milton and Rawlinson 1993; Solomon Islands 
Government 1986, 11, 13). Records of baitfish catch and effort 
dating from the start of Solomon Taiyo showed that Solomon 
Taiyo's 'catch per unit of effort' in the baitfishery had remained 
stable, even in the most heavily fished areas [13]. 
The other contestable assertion in the Kalgovas piece is that 
Solomon Taiyo gave nothing in return for their baitfish catches, 
and that they refused to share the catch. The reefs and lagoons 
where villagers fished were considered customary land, and from 
the outset there was a royalty payment system administered by 
the Fisheries Division, by which Solomon Taiyo negotiated access 
and paid reef-owning villagers for the use of baitgrounds. It took 
several years for a workable system to be established, it was 
arguable that the royalties were very low, and there were ongoing 
arguments about which villagers had rights to receive the 
payments, but most Solomon Islanders were aware that the 
company could only fish in baitgrounds where access had been 
negotiated with landowners, and that the company paid royalties 
for fishing there. Furthermore, most Solomon Islanders were also 
aware that Solomon Taiyo vessels commonly gave away bycatch 
(non target species which had no commercial value to the 
company) to villagers, or exchanged fish for fresh fruit and 
vegetables. 
If Solomon Taiyo's fishing was sustainable, its nearshore fishing 
activities were negotiated with villagers who were paid for this 
access, and the company did share some of the catch with 
villagers, why did the opposite narrative persist in representations 
such as that in the Kalgovas piece? Part of the reason was that the 
Solomon Islands government and Solomon Taiyo failed to counter 
negative rumors about the company, and failed to disseminate 
information about the environmental impacts of its fishing 
activities, so the fact that Solomon Taiyo's fishing was sustainable 
was not common knowledge. The arrangements for baitfishing 
were, however. Why, then, did Solomon Islanders make such 
representations, and why did Westerners such as Kalgovas accept 
these representations readily without verification? I propose that 
identity politics against Japanese fishing companies, and wider 
Asian resource capitalism, predisposed Western and Islander 
players to perceive the company negatively. Representations of 
Solomon Taiyo slotted into existing global discourses of Asian 
resource plunderers. 
This kind of negativity regarding Solomon Taiyo resembles an 
earlier set of anti-Asian identity politics engaged in by Westerners 
in Solomon Islands. The majority of trading businesses in Solomon 
Islands have long been run by the local Chinese community, who 
came to Solomon Islands in the early colonial period as 
tradespeople, then later became traders. Before the Chinese trade 
stores were established, stores had been run by large companies 
such as Burns Philp and Lever Bros, or individual Western traders 
and planters. Chinese traders were unwelcome competition 
because they bought produce from locals at higher prices and sold 
goods to locals at lower prices than the big companies. Chinese 
shopkeepers built a better rapport with locals, socialized with 
locals more, and provided eating houses that were more affordable 
and comfortable for Solomon Islanders than the Western colonial 
clubs. In response, the big companies persuaded the colonial 
administration to disadvantage the Chinese traders. According to 
Bennett, as part of their campaign against Chinese traders, 
Western companies portrayed the Chinese as a bad moral influence 
on Solomon Islanders (Bennett 1987, 206-210). This seems to have 
been partly a conscious strategy to influence the government to 
restrict Chinese traders' activities, but was probably also less 
consciously motivated by a sense of rivalry about who should bring 
'civilization' -as it was called in those days-to Solomon Islands. 
Eventually the large Western companies pulled out of trading and 
left it to the Chinese but Western representations of the Chinese 
as avaricious and exploitative of Solomon Islanders persisted. A 
1975 report into foreign businesses in Solomon Islands corroborated 
Bennett's finding that this reputation had no basis in historical 
fact, in finding that Solomon Islanders were 'well served' by their 
Chinese traders. Their prices were judged to be fair and the 
margins low (United Nations Development Advisory Team 1975). 
Western representations of Chinese traders as preying on Solomon 
Islanders may be seen as part of a set of global English language 
anti-Asian discourses to which representations of Solomon Taiyo as 
a 'bad' company also belong. One manifestation of this discourse 
in Western representations of Solomon Taiyo was to contrast 
exploitative Asian/ Japanese capitalism with benevolent Western 
capitalism. The main way this was done was through comparisons 
of Solomon Taiyo with the other large businesses in Solomon 
Islands, which were Western rather than Asian; Solomon Islands 
Plantations Limited (SIPL, a joint venture with the British 
Commonwealth Development Corporation, CDC); Kolumbangara 
Forestry Plantations Limited (KFPL, also with CDC); and Solomon 
Telekom (with a British telecommunications company). For 
example, a Western church leader who had lived in Solomon 
Islands for more than ten years, told me that Solomon Taiyo's 
working conditions and housing were much worse than those of the 
other large joint ventures, that Solomon Taiyo gave nothing to the 
community compared to the other companies, and that Japanese 
managers did not care about their workers, because Japanese 
companies had little sense of social responsibility [14]. 
Interviews for this research and documentary sources from the 
Solomon Islands National Union of Workers (SINUW) showed that 
working conditions and remuneration of all of the large joint 
ventures including Solomon Taiyo were similar, around the 
national standard. Solomon Taiyo also donated money to various 
community sports facilities in Noro, and had a small project fund 
local villagers could apply to for community projects. According to 
a school teacher in Noro, Solomon Taiyo gave plenty of assistance 
to Noro school in comparison to the school KFPL workers used at 
Ringgi Cove [15]. Solomon Taiyo's employee housing in the base 
town of Noro was abysmal; overcrowded, unsanitary and not 
maintained properly. This, however, was not solely the fault of the 
company but was also the responsibility of the Western Province 
government, which had reserved the right to develop Solomon 
Taiyo's housing as its own business venture, yet never developed 
the housing properly. Unfavourable comparisons with the Western 
joint ventures on the grounds of social responsibility were thus like 
representations of ecological unsustainability. They contradicted 
the available evidence, leading to the conclusion that identity 
politics were involved. 
Differences between Western and Islander representations 
The examples of negative representations of Japanese fishing 
presented thus far may equally have come from Islanders or 
Westerners; interviewees from both groups said these kinds of 
things about Solomon Taiyo. Other representations, however, were 
more likely to come from one group or the other. 
Many Westerners encountered during fieldwork refused to 
acknowledge any benefits from Solomon Taiyo to Solomon Islands. 
They downplayed benefits from employment by claiming that the 
pay and conditions were bad, that social benefits were 
counteracted by social breakdown caused by the company's 
operations, and in any case came at the expense of the 
environment, or were only what was left after the Japanese 
partner siphoned off the profits. Many Islander interviewees, on 
the other hand, were more balanced in their assessments; at first 
portraying the company as bad, then qualifying this with positive 
comments, for example, that the company provided a lot of 
employment and training and that they liked the company's 
products. Japanese manager Okubo suggested Solomon Islanders 
were more balanced in their assessments of Solomon Taiyo 
because most Solomon Islanders had either worked for the 
company themselves at some stage or a close relative had, so they 
had direct experience on which to base their opinions, whereas 
most Western people had no direct experience (16]. 
One of the Australian accountants who had worked for Solomon 
Taiyo, however, had a different explanation (17]. He felt that 
Western expatriates in Solomon Islands were so negative in their 
representations of Solomon Taiyo because they resented an Asian 
company bringing development to Solomon Islands. He thought 
Westerners saw themselves as having a special role as teachers of 
modernization to Solomon Islanders, and so were predisposed to 
disparage Solomon Taiyo. 
In a broad sense, Japanese modernization has posed a challenge to 
Western identity as modern since at least the 1904 Russo-Japanese 
war. A sense of rivalry on the part of Westerners in relation to the 
Japanese capitalism is visible in a range of late twentieth century 
English language books about Japan, such as Ezra Vogel's (1979) 
Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, Bill Emmot's (1989) 
The Sun Also Sets: Why Japan Will Not Be Number One and William 
Nester's (1990) Japan's Growing Power Over East Asia and the 
World Economy. During and after the 1997 Asian Crisis, some 
Westernerstriumphantly decried Japanese 'crony capitalism' 
(Milner 2000). Rivalry is also visible in some Western 
representations of Japanese modernity as having gone too far; a 
scary dystopia of overworked automatons and/or Blade 
Runner-esque cityscapes (Ueno n.d.), or of Japanese modern 
culture as 'kooky'. The rivalry noted by the Australian accountant 
in Western representations of Solomon Taiyo as bad modernization 
could be seen as part of this broader rivalry with Japanese 
modernity. 
Solomon Islanders did not share this sense of rivalry between 
modern peoples and have been subordinated by both Westerners 
and Japanese. The subordination of Solomon Islanders had its roots 
in British colonialism but also continued after Independence 
through dependence on aid and foreign investment. As Asian 
companies and governments became wealthier and more 
internationally powerful in the late twentieth century, the 
tendency of Solomon Islanders to identify as subordinate to Asians, 
including Solomon Taiyo's Japanese managers, was strengthened 
(Tara Kabutaulaka c.1996). 
As well as being less determinedly negative about Solomon Taiyo 
than Westerners, Solomon Islanders' different subjective 
relationship to Japanese modernity was manifest in 
representations of Solomon Taiyo that attributed negative factors 
not to the company's Japanese ness/ Asian ness (as implicitly or 
explicitly distinct from Western companies) but with its 
foreignness, which cast it into the same category as Western 
companies (18]. 
Previous researchers Metzhoff and LiPuma found in the 1970s that 
Solomon Islanders perceived the working conditions at Solomon 
Taiyo as being as bad as (not worse than) those at any other 
expatriate-run company (Meltzhoff and LiPuma 1983, 31), and 
many Solomon Islander interviewees in my research expressed 
similar sentiments. One local church leader who had worked for 
several years in Bougainville before working in Noro drew parallels 
between Solomon Taiyo and the Australian mining company in 
Bougainville [19]. Two Solomon Islander interviewees said they saw 
the behavior of Solomon Taiyo as following the pattern of any large 
multi- or transnational corporation, for example, through using 
overseas subsidiaries to control prices [20]. Other interviewees 
who worked for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) spoke of 
Solomon Taiyo as one of the overseas companies that gave money 
or 'big fat promises' to local people to make them forget the 
potential impact on their lives of environmental degradation [21]. 
Figure 1 is a poster produced by the local NGO Solomon Islands 
Development Trust (SIDT). It portrays Solomon Taiyo (frame 2) as 
one of the big companies of no specified nationality that has given 
villagers money for their resources-trees, fish, and gold-and then 
left villagers unable to feed or house themselves, resulting in aid 
dependency. 
Solomon Islands Development Trust Poster 
While some Solomon Islander representations of Solomon Taiyo 
thus portrayed Solomon Taiyo as a negative influence because it 
was foreign rather than because it was Asian or Japanese (as 
opposed to Western), some Solomon Islander representations were 
the same as Western representations in contrasting Solomon Taiyo 
negatively with Western-sponsored development projects. For 
example, Solomon Islander interviewees who worked for the 
Ministry of Finance and the Investment Corporation of Solomon 
Islands contrasted Solomon Taiyo unfavourably with the level of 
local management achieved in the British joint ventures [22]. 
Some of the passages presented earlier in this paper illustrate the 
point, with Islanders deploring the activities of Asian/ Japanese 
resource plunderers compared to the activities of 'good' Western 
aid donors. 
It is possible the trope of the Japanese/ Asian resource plunderer 
has simply diffused into Solomon Islands understandings of peoples 
because it is so widespread in the English-speaking world, even 
though the subjectivity that generated the trope of bad Japanese 
modernity is one Solomon Islanders share. As noted earlier, 
Western-sponsored images of immoral exploitative Chinese traders 
took hold in Solomon Islander imaginaries throughout the colonial 
era and beyond, so it would not have been difficult for the slightly 
different image of the Asian resource plunderer to take root. 
Another related explanation for anti-Asian/ Japanese (rather than 
simply anti-foreign) representations of Solomon Taiyo by Solomon 
Islanders, is that Solomon Islanders may have been tapping into the 
Orientalist aspect of discourse of the Japanese/ Asian resource 
plunderer specifically for a Western audience. This probably 
happened in interviews with me. Some Solomon Islander 
interviewees-knowing that Western people enjoy (or at least are 
predisposed to expect) the discourse of the Japanese/ Asian 
resource plunderer-may have tailored their story to me as a 
Westerner. Some interviewees may have been telling me the story 
they thought I wanted to hear about Solomon Taiyo, a story that 
by implication painted Western development enterprises in a 
positive light. 
This may have been behind the very negative (and inaccurate) 
picture of the company painted by the 'fisher from Lengana' in the 
Kalgovas (2000) piece quoted earlier. It could be that the fisher 
from Lengana's representation that Solomon Taiyo fished without 
consultation with or recompense to villagers constituted a 
deployment of 'weapons of the weak' (Scott 1985). Creative 
manipulation of dominant groups' discourses is one way for 
subordinated peoples to achieve their ends, and the playing off of 
dominant groups against each other is another useful strategy. For 
example, Acida Rita Ramos found that Indigenous Brazilians 
utilized divisions between groups of non-Indigenous Brazilians in 
order to gain media and political attention so as to create space to 
get a point across and to attract material support (Ramos 1998, 16, 
98-101 ). During the Cold War some Pacific Island governments 
gained benefits from rivalry between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, by resolving a standoff with the USA over fishing 
access fees in the late 1980s by granting access to Soviet fishing 
fleets, which made the support of Pacific Islands countries 
relatively more important to the US government than their 
domestic tuna lobby. Some Pacific Island countries, including 
Solomon Islands, continue to benefit from the rivalry between the 
People's Republic of China and Taiwan. Perhaps the fisher from 
Lengana saw Western NGOs like the World Wildlife Fund (Kalgovas' 
employer) as potential allies to gain leverage with Solomon Taiyo. 
The fisher from Lengana may have been engaging in pragmatic 
politics by appealing to internationally circulating negative images 
of Japanese fisheries in a story designed to spark Western NGO 
concern. 
Japanese fisheries-related self-presentations 
Solomon Taiyo's Japanese managers were aware of their 
unflattering image in the minds of many Westerners and Solomon 
Islanders. The General Manager explained it by saying that 
Japanese people were not good at senden (public relations). 
Japanese managers' self image in relation to Solomon Taiyo and 
Solomon Islanders was quite different to the image in Western and 
Islander representations. Japanese managers saw their role in 
Solomon Islands society through Solomon Taiyo in terms of the 
company being adevelopment and modernization success story. As 
General Manager Komito left Solomon Taiyo to return to Tokyo in 
1991, a newspaper report of his farewell speech listed some of the 
achievements of the company (Nius 1991, 9). The popular canned 
product Solomon Blue was being sold regionally and Solomon Taiyo 
had fulfilled its social obligations regarding employment, taxes and 
foreign earning. Indeed it excelled in terms of employment, being 
the only substantial employer of village women in the country. 
Komito was reported as saying Solomon Taiyo was the most 
successful tuna joint venture in the region, even the world. 
When the former Mayor of lrabu (the town in Okinawa from which 
most of the fishermen employed by Solomon Taiyo came) visited 
other countries in the Pacific, all the government officials he 
spoke to said they wanted to start a company like Solomon Taiyo 
because it employed local people and the shore base was a 
permanent investment in the country [23]. The former Mayor had 
toured places in the Pacific where lrabu fishermen were employed, 
such as Papua New Guinea, and Mindanao in the Philippines. He 
described Solomon Taiyo as a model other countries wanted to 
follow. The Okinawan fishermen's attitude to modernization was 
interesting in that Okinawa itself suffered internal colonialism 
within Japan, has remained economically disadvantaged and been 
denigrated by mainland Japanese in part for being 'primitive'. The 
islands of Miyako, where Solomon Taiyo's fishermen came from, 
were even more disadvantaged and were considered backward also 
by other Okinawans. Elsewhere I have discussed the Okinawan 
fishermen's complicated perspectives on Solomon Taiyo as a 
modernization project (Barclay 2006). 
As part of general public relations and corporate citizenship, 
Solomon Taiyo and its managers made donations to local charities 
(Nius 1988, 3; News Drum 1976, 2). Japanese managers also tended 
to view the company itself as a kind of charity. A Maruha employee 
in the Overseas Operations Section working closely with Solomon 
Taiyo described it as a 'charity company' [24]. In relating the 
history of Solomon Taiyo the General Manager said Maruha had not 
wanted to become a 'charity company,' Maruha would prefer that 
Solomon Taiyo was profitable. He said it was impossible to turn a 
good profit because the Solomon Islands government as co-owner 
had insisted on a shore base when the costs of doing business in 
Solomon Islands were high compared to major competitor country 
Thailand, and because the Solomon Islands government had no 
capital to invest in the company or utilities to support the shore 
base [25]. 
The Operations Manager's version of the history of the company 
provided a different take on Maruha's charitable motivations in 
Solomon. He said that the President of then Taiyo Gyogyo in the 
1970s, Nakabe Kennichi, had visited Solomon Taiyo and told 
employees that Solomon Taiyo's purpose was to 'feed the people 
of the Solomons'. He told the managers to look after the Solomon 
Islanders, it did not matter whether Solomon Taiyo was profitable; 
the important thing was to keep the company going so that it 
could be of benefit for Solomon Islanders. In those days, according 
to the Operations Manager, the word of the President of the 
company was law, so this order from Nakabe was taken very 
seriously. When he died his son Nakabe Tojiro took over as 
President, and Tojiro felt Solomon Taiyo should continue to be 
managed according to his father's wishes. The Operations Manager 
said that in the 1990s Maruha moved in the direction of requiring 
their overseas joint ventures to be profitable, but he believed 
there genuinely was a charitable motivation behind Taiyo Gyogyo's 
involvement in Solomon Taiyo in the 1970s and 1980s [26]. 
Okinawan fisherman lkema corroborated the Operations Manager's 
story that the President of Taiyo Gyogyo had ordered Solomon 
Taiyo to feed the people of Solomon Islands, and this fisherman 
felt that through baitfishing fees and other benefits to Solomon 
Islands that Solomon Taiyo had fulfilled this promise to provide 
[27]. 
This identification on the part of the Japanese as charitable 
benefactors in relation to Solomon Islands is interesting. On one 
level it is a generous stance to take. But at the same time it is a 
profoundly dominant stance, one that is patronizing of Solomon 
Islanders. This identification is not of an equal partnership but 
involves self-identifying as having something the other lacks. 
Solomon Islanders had been feeding themselves perfectly 
adequately for thousands of years by the time Solomon Taiyo was 
established, what they lacked was the cultural capital and 
particular skills for building and maintaining a successful capitalist 
enterprise. Part of the dominance Japanese assumed in relation to 
Solomon Islanders through Solomon Taiyo was of moderns in 
relation to a 'backward' society. 
None of the managers interviewed in 1999 labeled Solomon 
Islanders 'backward' or 'primitive', but in the 1970s and early 
1980s Solomon Taiyo managers, like Western expatriates living in 
Solomon Islands, imagined Solomon Islanders, especially those 
living in villages, to be 'primitive'. This (mis)understanding was 
then used to justify the crowded housing and monotonous food 
provided by the company, because managers felt that village life 
was no better (Meltzhoff and LiPuma 1983, 23). 
By the later 1990s Solomon Islands' lack of modernity was 
understood by Japanese managers in terms of an inhospitable 
environment for capitalism. This was often explained as a result of 
Solomon Islanders' 'traditional' work ethic and the quality of 
government policies, but also in terms of other factors such as the 
distance from major trade routes making freight costs 
uncompetitive and necessitating the importation of many inputs. 
Japanese managers felt Solomon Islands' difficult business 
environment was the reason Solomon Taiyo was unprofitable. One 
Maruha manager wrote that Solomon Taiyo could not 'be 
competitive with merely her own power and capacity', so the 
Japanese government must help with grant aid and low cost 
finance, and the Solomon Islands government must subsidize the 
company, for example, by requesting aid loans to pay for capital 
investment in the fleet (Tarte 1998, 124-126) [28]. This was in 
contrast to Solomon Islander and Western explanations for the lack 
of profitability, which often involved suspicions that Japanese 
managers were cheating Solomon Islanders of profit, for example, 
by transfer pricing through Maruha subsidiaries in order to avoid 
paying dividends or taxes in Solomon Islands. 
Japanese managers knew that Maruha's continued involvement in 
an unprofitable company aroused suspicions in Westerners [29]. In 
Western (particularly Anglo and North American) versions of 
capitalism profit is paramount. But in Japanese capitalism, at least 
until the 1990s recession, profit has been relatively downplayed 
and other factors, such as market share, have assumed relative 
importance. When I asked Maruha manager Shibuya about Solomon 
Taiyo's lack of profitability, he answered that Solomon Taiyo had 
not made a profit because Japanese companies look after their 
employees properly, not like Western companies, which were 
quick to sack their employees rather than forfeit dividends for 
shareholders [30]. Technical reports on the management and 
financial structure of Solomon Taiyo (Hughes and Thaanum 1995; 
SPPF 1999) found that Maruha was acting in a characteristically 
Japanese way with cross shareholdings with an investment bank 
reducing the pressure for profitability, and factors other than 
profit motivating continued involvement, such as maintaining a 
supply of skipjack to facilitate important trading relationships. 
These reports found no evidence of unethical practices on the part 
of Maruha, and acknowledged the difficulties inherent in Solomon 
Islands' business environment, but did not share the view of 
Japanese managers that it was impossible that Solomon Taiyo 
could be profitable, asserting that Japanese management had 
given up on the idea of profitability too easily, and not exhausted 
all avenues for improving profits. 
Japanese management perspectives on Solomon Islands as being in 
need of charity were not nakedly racist, and were based in the 
frustrating reality of business life in Solomon Islands. At the same 
time, the representations also bolstered Japanese positions of 
authority and wealth in Solomon Taiyo by portraying (backward) 
Solomon Islanders as incapable of supporting a functioning business 
without (modern) Japanese assistance. The discourse of the 
charity company was closely related to developmentalist 
discourses revealed by critical development studies theorists in the 
1990s as subordinating peoples identified as 'underdeveloped' to 
those who are seen to have achieved modernization and are thus 
identified as 'developed' (see for example, Sachs 1997; Manzo 
1991; Hanlon 1998). 
Japanese self-identification in the discourse of the charity 
company was a 'good' identity, in contrast to prevalent English 
language images of the 'bad' Japanese of Solomon Taiyo. 
Competitive identification as 'good' was also in evidence in 
narratives about the social and environmental practices of 
Japanese fisheries in contrast to American fisheries. Several 
Japanese interviewees compared Japanese tuna 
fisheries-employing the pole-and-line and longline methods, with 
a relatively small purse seine fleet made up of smaller capacity 
vessels-favorably against the mainly purse seine US fleet, which 
included vessels of very large capacity (and therefore potentially 
ecologically destructive efficiency) [31]. It was not just the 
environmental effects of purse seining that caused contention. The 
Japanese-favored pole-and-line method is very labor intensive, 
and so over a certain level of catch it is cheaper to use the very 
large purse seine ships with labor saving technologies. Since the 
1990s purse seine caught tuna has therefore all but killed 
international markets for the more expensive pole-and-line caught 
skipjack, of which Japanese companies were the major producers. 
Fishing boat with purse seine 
Competitive self-identification as 'good' fishers compared to the 
US fleet had a history in the long running rivalry between Japanese 
tuna fishing companies and the American Tunaboat Association 
(ATA). Until the 1970s the Japanese fleet dominated the Western 
Pacific Ocean. Then towards the end of the 1970s the US tuna 
fishing fleet started to move west across the Pacific because of 
declining catches, disputes over dolphins, and deteriorating 
relations with Latin American governments in the East Pacific. 
At this time newly independent island states were declaring 200 
nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) under the 
in-progress United Nations Law of the Sea, and demanding access 
fees from distant water fishing fleets. The US tuna lobby did not 
want to pay access fees and the US government supported them in 
this through a piece of domestic legislation called the Magnuson 
Act. Any country that impeded US tuna boats from fishing for 
highly migratory species (on the grounds that such species do not 
belong to any country) in their EEZ could have their trade to the 
US embargoed. Until the late 1980s US tuna boats fished illegally in 
the West Pacific, with US government support. 
Japanese managers' self identification in opposition to US tuna 
interests came to the fore in representations of a 1980s dispute 
about illegal fishing by a US purse seine vessel, the Jeanette 
Diana. In 1984 several Pacific Island countries became angry at 
illegal fishing by US purse seiners in their EEZs. The Jeanette Diana 
was a very large, high tech purse seiner with its own small 
helicopter to 'spot' schools of fish. The ship had been noticed in 
several places within Solomon Islands waters over a period of days, 
so the authorities sent out a patrol boat to request the Jeanette 
Diana to stop so they could board and check whether or not the 
ship had been fishing. When the Captain of the tuna boat refused 
to stop, the patrol boat fired shots across the bow of the tuna 
boat. The boat had been fishing, so it was impounded and the 
Captain was prosecuted. Under pressure from the American 
Tunaboat Association the Magnuson Act was activated and all trade 
from Solomon Islands to the US was embargoed. The only 
substantial trade from Solomon Islands to the US at that time was 
frozen fish sales from Solomon Taiyo to canneries in American 
Samoa and Puerto Rico. Suddenly Solomon Taiyo had to open new 
markets for their frozen fish in Thailand, which ruined the 
financial year for Solomon Taiyo [32]. The US government refused 
to acknowledge the findings of the Solomon Islands High Court that 
the Jeanette Diana had been fishing illegally. The Los Angeles 
Times quoted the Captain of the Jeanette Diana as saying 'we 
realized we weren't dealing with a rational government ... the laws 
don't mean anything to those people' (Kengalu 1998, 170-171). 
Eventually the Jeanette Diana was sold back to the original owners 
(who were reimbursed by US taxpayers) in 1985 and the embargo 
was lifted. 
Japanese fisheries people took the moral high ground over the 
unquestionably bad behavior of the US regarding EEZs in the 
Western Pacific. A Japanese media source described the US 
position on EEZs as contradictory because, although the 
government supported US boats fishing in the EEZs of other 
countries, the US coastguard prevented foreign boats from fishing 
in the US EEZ. This source said the US was 'arrogantly subverting 
the rights and laws of another nation' (Kengalu 1998, 171). Fuji 
Hiroshi, a manager in the Overseas Operations section in the Tokyo 
office of Taiyo Gyogyo, was reported by the Pacific Islands Monthly 
as having said 'we are very unhappy about the manner in which 
these huge ships fish' (Pacific Islands Monthly 1985, 41, 45). He 
estimated there were about 35 500 ton purse seiners based in 
Japan but in the USA there were many more even larger vessels, 
such as the 1, 500 ton Jeanette Diana, which he thought were very 
environmentally destructive. Fuji hoped that the high operating 
costs of the very large vessels might drive them out of business. 
'The American policy about following migratory fish, regardless of 
exclusive economic zones, causes problems. It has led to disorder.' 
Fuji said he was sure fish stocks would be depleted as a result. File 
material showed that Maruha and Solomon Taiyo managers 
repeatedly registered concern with the Solomon Islands 
government over protecting Solomon Islands' skipjack stocks from 
purse seiners [33]. 
Solomon Taiyo's Okinawan fishermen also expressed ill feeling 
towards Westerners about purse seining. Fisherman Toriike thought 
it hypocritical of Western organizations, such as Greenpeace, to 
oppose whaling and longlining but not purse seining, and thought 
the reason Greenpeace did not campaign for a ban on purse 
seining was because the American tuna industry was heavily 
involved and Greenpeace found it easier to target Japanese 
industries than American ones. He questioned American retailers' 
marketing of purse seine tuna as dolphin-friendly when he felt the 
pole-and-line method (which he specialized in) was much more 
environmentally friendly than purse seining [34]. 
Conclusion 
Western and Islander representations of Solomon Taiyo's fishing 
practices often included suspicions of illegality and accusations of 
ecological unsustainability. These representations were quite 
inaccurate, in fact, Solomon Taiyo's fishing practices were on the 
socially and ecologically responsible end of the spectrum of 
industrial fishery practices. This discrepancy between actuality 
and representation may be partly explained by a predisposition on 
the part of Westerners to view Japanese fishing practices 
negatively. Such representations of Solomon Taiyo drew on wider 
global discourses of predatory Japanese/ Asian resource capitalism, 
which have as their flip-side the discourse of good Western 
capitalism. These English-language discourses filtered into Islander 
worldviews. 
Some Solomon Islander representations of Solomon Taiyo's fishing 
practices were more balanced than Western representations in 
presenting positive as well as negative images of the company. 
Some of the positive representations of the company by Islanders 
were in the vein of taking pride in having a large modern industrial 
enterprise in Solomon Islands. But most of the positive 
representations of Solomon Taiyo were buried in the detail of 
narratives that started off with unfavourable representations; 
despite containing positive representations the main discourse 
shaping those narratives was of bad Japanese capitalism. In 
contrast to Western representations that compared Solomon Taiyo 
unfavorably with Western companies, many Solomon Islander 
representations categorized Solomon Taiyo together with Western 
companies, both as big bad foreign businesses that dominated 
Solomon Islanders. These representations make sense in terms of 
Solomon Islanders' history as a colonized people and contemporary 
status as 'underdeveloped', and which involves quite different 
experiences than Westerners in relation to the Japanese and 
modernity. 
Some Solomon Islanders representations of Solomon Taiyo, 
however, were almost identical to Western representations. Some 
of this similarity in representations may be put down to simple 
diffusion of Western representations through the English language. 
Another explanation is that Solomon Islanders may have bought 
into the discourse of the Japanese/ Asian resource plunderer in 
framing their representations for a Western audience. In some of 
these cases Solomon Islanders may have been representing 
Solomon Taiyo as a 'bad' company, in implicit contrast to 'good' 
Western companies, in order to leverage assistance from 
Westerners. 
Japanese self-representations by contrast were of law-abiding, 
ecologically sound fisheries that involved the Japanese bringing 
modernization in the form of economic development to Solomon 
Islands. The identification as charitable benefactor towards 
Solomon Islanders was a dominant stance, just as Western 
identifications as teachers of development to the Third World have 
been. Self-presentations by Japanese fisheries people were often 
created in opposition to particular perspectives on US tuna 
fisheries as being ecologically irresponsible. 
The contradictions between representations of Japanese fishing 
practices between Westerners, Islanders and Japanese may be 
seen as part of a wider rivalry between Japan and the West over 
competing modernity strategies, with Islanders having a third view 
based on experiences of pursuing their interests among powerful 
and wealthy foreigners. 
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Notes 
[1] This research was part of doctoral work undertaken through the 
Institute for International Studies at the University of Technology 
Sydney. An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 
2003 liS annual research workshop, where Elaine Jeffreys, Bronwen 
Dalton, llaria Vanni and Guo Yingjie provided helpful comments. 
The ideas were further refined during a postdoctoral fellowship at 
the Crawford (formerly Asia Pacific) School of Economics and 
Government at the Australian National University, and presented 
again at the 2005 biennial conference of the Japanese Studies 
Association of Australia in Adelaide, South Australia. Thanks also to 
Mark Selden, Hirokazu Miyazaki and Chris Nelson for suggestions for 
improvements to the paper. 
[2] The conceptualization of identity and modernity in this 
paragraph borrows from an earlier paper (Barclay 2006). 
[3] Elsewhere I give an expanded explanation of connections 
between the various ideas tied together here as modernism and 
their relation to the study of identity (Barclay forthcoming). 
[4] Interview with Hirara in his office, 4 November 1998, Miyako 
Island, Okinawa. The Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Technology Sydney required that participants in this 
research remain anonymous. For that reason in this paper 
interviewees are referred to, not by their real names, but by place 
names. Okinawan interviewees have been given names of places in 
the Miyako Islands, Japanese mainlander interviewees are referred 
to by place names from the mainland, Solomon Islander 
interviewees are referred to by place names from the Solomons, 
and Westerners have place names from Australia. Interviews with 
Sarahaman fishers and Japanese managers were conducted in 
Japanese. Interviews with Solomon Islanders were conducted in 
English or Pijin. Translations into English are my own unless 
otherwise specified. 
[5] Solomon Islands was (and largely remains) a non-capitalist 
society with up to 90 per cent of the economy existing in the 
non-cash sphere. For a thorough discussion of the economic history 
of Solomon Islands since Western contact see Bennett (1987). 
[6] For an example of how important such university contacts were 
in Japanese fisheries businesses in Southeast Asia in the early 
twentieth century see Shimizu (1997). 
[7] Japanese manager Shibuya had worked in Solomon Taiyo twice, 
once as Financial Manager, then as General Manager in the 1990s, 
and also been posted more than once to the Overseas Operations 
section in the Tokyo office that dealt with Solomon Taiyo, among 
other joint ventures. Later he was promoted to Department Chief 
(bucho) of a central planning and finance department. 
[8] Although wholly nationally (government) owned, Soltai has 
remained dependent on international capital, expertise and trade 
networks (Barclay 2005). 
[9] This reputation has been damaged by the 2006 exposure of 
Japan's long-running underreporting of southern bluefin tuna catch 
while being a dominant player calling for ecological responsibility 
within the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna. See CCSBT (n.d.) and AFP (2006). 
[10]1nterview with Ndunde at his home, 13 June 1999, Munda, 
Solomon Islands. 
[11] The Marine Stewardship Council is a London-based 
non-governmental organization that works with fisheries to 
develop environmental industry standards. 
[12] For example, Interview with llangana at Agnes Lodge, 3 June 
1999, Munda, Solomon Islands; Interview with Kazukuru at her 
home, 12 June 1999, Munda, Solomon Islands. Factors that could 
have contributed to the perceived drops in food fish stocks include 
pollution and overfishing from rapidly growing coastal 
communities. Interview with Vangunu at the Fisheries Division 
offices, 11 August 1999, Honiara, Solomon Islands; National 
Fisheries Workshop held at the King Solomon Hotel in Honiara in 
July I August 2005. 
[13] For further details on the baitfishery and its sustainability see 
Barclay (forthcoming). Interviewees often asserted that Solomon 
Taiyo falsified baitfishing records so as to pay lower royalties, but 
from 1981 the system of monitoring baitfish catches for the 
purposes of stock assessments and payment of royalties to 
baitground owners had been designed to remove incentives to 
underreport by de-linking calculations of catch from calculations 
for payment, and enabling villagers to monitor activities for which 
they should be paid. Fisheries Division interviews and records 
contained no indications that Solomon Taiyo had falsified 
baitfishing records (Fisheries Division [Honiara]: RF 8/2, 
correspondence; Fisheries Division [Honiara]: F 8/6, 
correspondence; Blaber and Copland 1990; Blaber, Milton and 
Rawlinson 1993). 
[14]1nterview with Brisbane at the Nora Town Council, 23 June 
1999, Nora, Solomon Islands. 
[15]1nterview with Baru at Nora Primary School, 16 July 1999, 
Nora, Solomon Islands. 
[16]1nterviews with Okubo in Solomon Taiyo offices several times 
April-July 1999, Honiara and Noro, Solomon Islands. 
[17]1nterview with Sydney at his home office, September 1999, 
Sydney, Australia. 
[18]1 have elsewhere discussed Solomon Islanders' aversion to 
domination by foreigners as an aspect of the identity relations of 
Solomon Taiyo (Barclay 2004). 
[19]1nterview with Bougainville at Noro Town Council, 22 June 
1999, Noro, Solomon Islands. 
[20]1nterview with Choiseul at his home 20 May 1999, Honiara, 
Solomon Islands; interview with Roviana at Noro Town Council 
several times June-July 1999, Noro, Solomon Islands. 
[21]1nterview with Panatina at the office of the Young Women's 
Christian Association, 23 April1999, Honiara, Solomon Islands; 
interview with Bellona at the office of the Development Services 
Exchange, 29 April1999, Honiara, Solomon Islands. 
[22] Interview with Borukua and Maramasike at office of the 
Investment Corporation of Solomon Islands, 10 August 1999, 
Honiara, Solomon Islands. 
[23] Interview with Nakachi in the Fisheries Promotion Section 
office at Sarahama, 10 November 1998, lrabu Island, Okinawa. 
[24]1nterview with Shibuya in Maruha Head Office in Otemachi 
January 1999, Tokyo, Japan. 
[25] For further details on the cost structure and profitability of 
Solomon Taiyo see Barclay and Wakabayashi (2000). 
[26]1nterview with Osaka on the Solomon Taiyo Base several times 
June-July 1999, Noro, Solomon Islands. 
[27]1nterview with lkema in his home, 5 November 1998, lrabu 
Island, Okinawa. 
[28] Fisheries Division (Honiara): RF 8/2, correspondence, letter 
dated 3 Feb. 1997; Forum Fisheries Agency (Honiara): EL/3.2, 
Solomon Taiyo correspondence, letter dated 1 Aug. 1994. 
[29]1nterview with Osaka on the Solomon Taiyo Base several times 
June-July 1999, Noro, Solomon Islands. 
[30] Interview with Shibuya in Maruha Head Office in Otemachi 
January 1999, Tokyo, Japan. 
[31] Pole-and-line fishing involves poles with fixed lines and 
barbless hooks. The hooks are dipped into the water amongst 
schools of fish, from the side of the boat, and snagged fish are 
flicked up over the head of the fisher to land behind on the deck. 
The longline method uses a long line dropped out in the ocean 
dragging behind a fishing vessel. Short lengths of line with hooks 
dangle from the long line. The long line is reeled back into the 
vessel and snagged fish pulled aboard. Purse seine vessels have a 
large net they drop behind into the water, then run in a circle to 
make a tube of net vertical in the water, then pull the bottom 
shut like a purse, and the surrounded fish are pulled aboard with 
the net. 
[32]1nterview with Shibuya in Maruha Head Office in Otemachi 
January 1999, Tokyo, Japan. 
[33] Forum Fisheries Agency (Honiara): EL/3.10, Solomon Taiyo 
correspondence. 
[34] Interview with Toriike, at the Okinawa Rest House, 26 July 
1999, Noro, Solomon Islands. 
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